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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the estate. Although the court did not expressly state why it was impossible for a
lien to attach, the apparent reason is that if the lien was allowed this would be indirectly
charging the estate for the contract which was directly unenforceable. The decision is
one of first impression in Washington but is in harmony with the holdings of other
jurisdictions which have passed on the question. San Francisco Paving Co. v. Fairchild,
134 Cal. 220, 66 Pac. 255 (1901) ; Ness v. Wood, 42 Minn. 427, 44 N. W. 313 (1890).
CRIMINAL LAW
Bigamy-Necessity of Proving Continued Cohabitation. In State
v. Lewis' the court found it necessary to interpret the bigamy statute,'
which reads in part: "Every person who, having a husband or wife
living, shall marry another person, or continue to cohabit with such
second husband or wife in this state, shall be guilty of bigamy .... "
The information charged that the defendant, having a wife living,
did cohabit with a second wife in this state. The trial judge sustained
the defendant's demurrer. The supreme court affirmed the trial court
ruling that the allegation failed to charge a criminal offense. The
court said that where the second marriage was entered into in this state,
an act prohibited by the first provision of the statute, cohabitation need
not be alleged or proved. The second provision was placed in the Act
to meet those situations where a person contracts a bigamous marriage
in another state and thereafter moves into this state and continues to
cohabit with the second spouse in this state. Under that provision the
prosecution must allege and prove, not merely that the defendant has
cohabited with second wife in this state, but that the defendant con-
tinues to so cohabit.
The court stated that, under the statute, cohabitation must have
commenced in another state and continued in this state. Under this
interpretation we have two situations which are not prohibited but
which the legislature no doubt intended to include within the statute.
First, if the accused entered into the second marriage in another state
and immediately brought his second spouse into Washington where
cohabitation commenced, the accused's conduct would not come within
the scope of the statute as there could be no cohabitation in another
state which could be continued into Washington. The court in the
Lewis case was not willing to follow the reasoning of the Iowa court'
which assumed that because a marriage took place in another state,
cohabitation commenced. Secondly, if the accused4 entered into the
1 State v. Lewis, 46 Wn2d 438, 282 P.2d 297 (1955).2 RCW 9.15.010.
3 State v. Nadal, 69 Iowa 478, 29 N.W. 451 (1886).
4 The accused may he either a man or a woman, as the case may be. For the purpose
of this discussion it is convenient to speak of the accused as the male spouse.
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second marriage in another state, commenced cohabitation in that state,
and subsequently brought the second spouse into Washington where he
visited her at intervals, he would not be subject to conviction under the
statute since the cohabitation would not be continuous. Such a result
would be in accord with the holding of the Tennessee case' cited by
the court in the Lewis case. The quoted language states in part:
".... the question of statutory intention in this regard is freed from all
doubt by the use of the word 'continue', so that the proof must show,
not only a cohabitation, that is, a living or abiding together as man and
wife in a fixed location, as distinguished from a mere occasional contact,
or temporary association, however sexually intimate, but the express
language of the statute requires that the cohabitation must be of the
continuing and not the transitory type .... "'
The writer submits that the two situations set forth above were in-
tended by the legislature to be included within the scope of the statute.
The language of the Iowa court logically and adequately summarizes
this position: "The letter and spirit of the statute declare that cohabita-
tion in this state, under a void marriage in another state is a crime. The
courts will not draw such subtle distinctions as are made by counsel,
for the purpose of shielding the violaters of the law and contemners of
good morals."7
Aiding and Abetting-Presence with Intent to Render Assistance.
In the recent case of State v. Kelly8 the state attempted to obtain the
conviction of certain employees of an after hours night club under
RCW 66.44.100 which declares the opening of packaged liquor or con-
sumption of liquor in a public place to be a misdemeanor, and RCW
9.01.030 which provides that those persons aiding and abetting the
commission of a misdemeanor shall be punished as principals. The
court held that the doorkeepers, the hostess, and the waitresses who
did not actually serve mixers to the patrons, the principals in the crime,
merely assented but did not perform any service or other overt act
necessary for conviction as an accessory. The court states, "The door-
keepers, the hostess, and the waitresses who did not actually serve
'mixers' to the particular individuals named in the various counts may
have been ready, willing, and able to assist those individuals to consume
6 Jones v. State, 182 Tenn. 60, 184 S.W.2d 167 (1944).
G Ibid., 184 S.V.2d at 169.
7 State v. Nadal, supra, note 3, 29 N.W. at 452. The Iowa court, in interpreting a
similar statute, reached a result contrary to the result of the Lewis case.8 46 Wn.2d 594, 283 P.2d 684 (1955).
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liquor in a public place, but did they aid and abet them in doing so?"'
The court then answered their question in the negative.
It is well settled that assent alone does not constitute aiding and
abetting; " the courts do not punish a guilty mind without some related
physical acts. 1 However, the court in the Kelly case seemed to take a
limited view as to acts which are necessary to constitute one an acces-
sory. It seems that a conviction could have been sustained in the Kelly
case had the court been willing to accept the view adopted in many
jurisdictions, that a person is an accessory when assistance is rendered
or when such person is present to render assistance if necessary."
It seems that the facts of the Kelly case would uphold the conclusion
that the named defendants were present at the scene of the misde-
meanor with the intent to assist the various principals even if such
assistance was not actually rendered.
The Washington court has recognized this "presence to render assist-
ance if necessary" concept in State v. Gollikur." The court qualified
the rule by stating that for one who is merely present for the purpose of
rendering assistance if necessary to be an accessory, his presence must
have been by preconcert. 4 Such language would lead us to believe that
absent a conspiracy, one cannot be convicted as an accessory in the
case where he is merely present for the purpose of rendering assistance
if necessary.' If we were to stop here for the purpose of the Kelly case,
9 46 Wn.2d at 599, 283 P.2d at 687.
'o State v. Peasley, 80 Wash. 99, 141 Pac. 316 (1914) ; State v. Linden, 171 Wash.
92, 17 P.2d 635 (1932).
11 In State v. Linden, note 10, supra, the court held that it was not error to refuse
an instruction that mere knowledge or assent without positive overt acts would not
warrant a conviction of grand larceny. The court stated that while mere knowledge or
assent as a rule, unaccompanied by anything more, is not sufficient to constitute aiding
and abetting, it is not always necessary that aiding and abetting be accompanied by
overt acts. However, the court did find that overt acts were committed in this case.
In making the statement the court quotes from State v. Thomas, 156 Wash. 583, 287
Pac. 667 (1930), where the court held that failure to exercise a legal duty to prevent
the commission of a crime is more than mere acquiescence.12 People v. Hymer, 118 Cal. App2d 28, 257 P.2d 63 (1953) ("or have been present
for the purpose of assisting in its consummation") ; Territory of Hawaii v. Ebarra, 39
Hawaii 488 (1952) ("and who stand ready to assist in its perpetration should the neces-
sity arise") ; Raiford v. State, 59 Ala. 106 (1877) ; State v. Berger, 121 Iowa 581, 96
N.W. 1094 (1903).
's 159 Wash. 206, 292 Pac. 421 (1930). In this case the defendant kept watch for the
perpetrator of the crime of rape. Keeping a lookout or standing watch is consistently
recognized as a sufficient overt act to constitute one an aider and abettor.
14 This qualification is generally announced in other jurisdictions. Anderson v. State,
185 Okla. 355, 91 P.2d 974 (1939) ; West v. State, 25 Ala. App. 492, 149 So. 354 (1933) ;
State v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722 (1894) ; People v. Walker, 17 Cal. App.2d 372, 62
P.2d 163 (1936) ; 22 C. J. S. 158, § 87 (b).
1'5 But see Pereira v. U. S., 347 U. S. 1, 7 (1954). "Aiding, abetting, and counseling
are not terms which presuppose existence of an agreement, but such terms have a
broader application, making a defendant a principal when he consciously shares in a
criminal act, regardless of existence of a conspiracy."
[SUMMER
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1955
the defendants could not be convicted as accessories as there was no
evidence of any expressed arrangement for assistance between the
named defendants and the principals.
It would seem, however, that the necessity of preconcert would not
be present when the principal had knowledge of the presence of the
accessory and had knowledge of the latter's willingness to assist. Under
such a rule one could be convicted as an accessory when the following
conditions exist: (1) The accused is actually or constructively16 present
when the felony or misdemeanor is committed, and, (2) is either
actually aiding, abetting, assisting, or advising in its commission, or,
(3) is present for the purpose of rendering assistance if necessary, to
the knowledge of the party actually committing the crime.
The court in the Kelly case ruled that the state's evidence was in-
sufficient to take the case to the jury. If the court had adopted the last
mentioned rule there would have been a jury question as to whether
the perpetrator of the crime had knowledge of the presence of the
defendant and of their intention to render him service if necessary."
Such a result would seem to be desirable and would seem to be more
in harmony with the objects sought to be accomplished by the enact-
ment of RCW 66.44.100.
Negligent Homicide-Degree of Negligence Required. The recent
case of State v. Partridge" has made a significant change in the degree
of negligence required to support a conviction under the negligent
homicide statute." Under the wording of this statute one may be con-
victed of the crime of negligent homicide if he causes the death of
another person "1... by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless man-
ner or with disregard for the safety of others ......
In the case of State v. Dickert," the first case in which the negligent
homicide statute was considered, the court clearly indicated that the
term "reckless" did not mean the same thing in the negligent homicide
statute as it meant under the section of the motor vehicle code defining
l A "constructive presence" at the commission of an offense, so as to make one an
accessory, is such as would enable him to take part in aiding the escape of the per-
petrator, or giving him information of approaching danger, if necessary, or to be so
situated when the crime is committed as to be able to assist in commission or otherwise.
8A WORDS AND PHRASES 587. The term is commonly used in the "lookout" situation.
17This rule has been announced in many jurisdictions. State v. Minton, 234 N. C.
716, 68 S.E.2d 844, 31 A.L.R.2d 682 (1952) ; Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865(1887) as cited in 22 CJ.S. 161, § 88 (5) ; State v. Hart, 186 N.C. 582, 120 S.E. 345
(1923) ; State v. Ham, 238 N.C. 94, 76 S.E.2d 346 (1953) ; Davis v. State, 36 Ala. App.
573, 62 So.2d 224 (1952).
Is State v. Gooch, 105 Mo. 392, 16 S.W. 892 (1891).
19 147 Wash. Dec. 575, 289 P.2d 702 (1955).
20 RCW 46.56.040.
21 194 Wash. 629, 79 P.2d 328 (1938).
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"reckless driving".22 The court concluded that willful or wanton dis-
regard for the safety of others was not one of the elements of negligent
homicide. In the leading case of State v. Stevick 2 the court declared
the rule in Washington to be that ordinary negligence is sufficient to
sustain a conviction of negligent homicide. This has continued to be
the rule in this jurisdiction. The holding of the Partridge" case how-
ever, specifically overrules the Stevick" case and all prior cases" hold-
ing that ordinary negligence will support a conviction of negligent
homicide when the driver is charged with the operation of a motor
vehicle in a reckless manner. The opinion states that to operate a
motor vehicle in a reckless manner, as specified by the statute, requires
something more than ordinary negligence. Reckless driving, for the
purposes of the negligent homicide statute, was defined as "the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle in a heedless, careless or rash manner or in a
manner indifferent to consequences."
To fully appreciate the impact of the holding in the Partridge case,
it is necessary to look into the motivation which prompted the legis-
lature to enact the negligent homicide statute. The frequency of trag-
edies in connection with the operation of motor vehicles made legisla-
tion desirable, if not necessary. The Partridge case indicates that the
statute was passed at the request of the prosecutors who were having
difficulty obtaining convictions under the existing manslaughter
statute2 Juries are reluctant to convict negligent automobile drivers
of manslaughter even though the evidence proves all of the elements
of the crime. This is due to a popular feeling that manslaughter is not
the proper label for cases of homicide committed through violation of
traffic rules."9 A conviction of manslaughter carries with it a mark of
infamy, a token of disgrace, which commonly is not associated with a
conviction of negligent homicide. The negligent homicide statute
plainly was not enacted for the benefit of the accused.
Although the purpose of enacting the negligent homicide statute was
to make it easier to convict the careless motorist who caused the death
22 RCW 46.56.020.
2323 Wn.2d 420, 161 P.2d 181 (1945).
24 147 Wash. Dec. 575, 289 P.2d 702 (1955).
25 23 Wn.2d 420, 161 P.2d 181 (1945).
26 State v. Dickert, 194 Wash. 629, 79 P.2d 328 (1938); State v. McDaniels, 30
Wn2d 76, 190 P.2d 705 (1948) ; State v. Carlsten, 17 Wn.2d 573, 136 P.2d 183 (1943).
27 State v. Partridge, 147 Wash. Dec. at 580, 289 P.2d 706.
28 99 A. L. R. 756; 3 Am. Jua. § 787.
29 RCW 9.48.060.
30 Note, Negligent Homicide, 25 CAUF. L. Rmv. (1936) ; see also, State v. Wojahl,
- Ore.-, 282 P.2d 675 (1955), a recent Oregon case giving an excellent coverage
of the entire subject of negligent homicide.
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of another,3 this purpose was accomplished in Washington solely by
placing a euphemism before the jury. Other states accomplished this
purpose by requiring a lesser degree of negligence to convict the care-
less motorist under a negligent homicide statute than was required to
convict under a manslaughter statute." This was not the case in
Washington; at the time that the negligent homicide statute was
enacted, this jurisdiction allowed a conviction under the manslaughter
statute upon a showing of ordinary negligence.Y3 Manslaughter statutes
of other states similar to Washington's are rare. Most of them require
a finding of at least gross negligence.
The negligent homicide statutes of most states provide for a less
severe punishment than is found under existing manslaughter statutes. 5
In Washington, however, the punishment provided under the negligent
homicide statute is equal to that provided under the manslaughter
statute. In each case the offender may be sentenced to not more than
twenty years in the state prison, or not more than one year in the
county jail, or a fine of $1000, or both fine and imprisonment. The
careless motorist who fatally injures another in Washington stands to
pay a stiffer penalty than would be imposed in most other jurisdic-
tions."
Acts which will sustain a conviction under the negligent homicide
statute will also sustain a conviction under the manslaughter statute.
The state can elect under which statute it desires to proceed. But
since it was easier to obtain a conviction by labeling the offense negli-
gent homicide, the state nearly always would elect to proceed under
that statute. However, the ruling of the Partridge case has undermined
the reasons which led to the enactment of the negligent homicide
=3 This would seem to be the reasoning behind similar statutes in other jurisdictions.
Rex v. Preusantanz, D.C.R. 421, 65 Can. Crim. Cases 129 (1936) ; People v. Pociask,
14 Cal.2d 679, 96 P.2d 788 (1939).
3 People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 212 N.W. 97 (1927). This was also true
under the first California statute, Cal. Stats. 1935, p. 2141.
33 State v. Hedges, 8 Wn2d 652, 113 P.2d 530 (1941) ; State v. Sill, 147 Wash. Dec.
581, 289 P.2d 720 (1955).31 Reg. v. Swindall, 2 Car. & K. 230, 2 Cox C. C. 141; Copeland v. State, 154 Tenn.
7, 285 S.W. 565, 49 A. C. R. 605 (1926) ; State v. Gutheil, 98 Utah 205, 98 P.2d 943
(1940); State v. Whately, 210 Wis. 157, 245 N.W. 93, 99 A. L. R. 749. And see the
exhaustive supplemental note following this case, 99 A. L. R. 756.
:3t Vt. Stats. 1921, p. 217 (5 years or $2000 or both); La. Stats. 1930, p. 141 (5
years); N. H. STATS. 1931 (Special Session 1930), p. 85; State v. McComb, 33 Wyo.
346, 239 Pac. 526 (1925).
-O Oregon, for example, has a maximum penalty of not more than 3 years or $2500.
Oma. REv. STAT. § 163, 090, amended by Oregon Laws 1953, c 676, § 192, Statutes 195,
c 1006.
37 See the concurring opinion of Justice Mallery in State v. Stevick, mipra, note 23.
But apparently the state must make an election as he indicates that the state cannot
allege an offense under one statute and sustain a conviction upon proof of the other.
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statute. Since a higher degree of negligence is required to sustain a
conviction of negligent homicide than is required to sustain a convic-
tion of manslaughter in Washington, it may, in all probability, now be
easier to convict a careless driver of manslaughter than to convict him
of negligent homicide. If the true reason for enacting the negligent
homicide statute was to enable the prosecutors to get more convictions,
the purpose of the legislature has been defeated by the Partridge case.
Prosecutors will now be more willing to proceed under the manslaughter
statute.
The court has taken the first step in putting Washington in line with
the majority of jurisdictions as far as the degree of negligence required
to support a negligent homicide conviction is concerned." The next
step is for the legislature39 to put us in line with other jurisdictions as
far as manslaughter is concerned by requiring something more than
mere ordinary negligence to support a manslaughter conviction. The
legislature might also look into the propriety of imposing the same
penalty under the negligent homicide statute as is imposed under the
manslaughter statute.
It must be noted that the Partridge case decided only the degree of
negligence required to constitute reckless driving. The court clearly
pointed out that they were not dealing with the further language of the
negligent homicide statute. Therefore, the degree of negligence re-
quired to sustain a conviction of negligent homicide when the motorist
is charged with operating a motor vehicle "with disregard for the
safety of others" must remain an open question.
THEODORE D. ZYLSTRA
Justifiable Homicide-Prevention of Commission of Adultery. In State v. Nylavd,
147 Wash. Dec. 217, 287 P.2d 345 (1955), the court considered an appeal from a
conviction of murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree. The defendant
admitted that he shot his wife and her companion. The theory of his defense, on which
the trial court refused instructions, was that the killings were necessary to prevent the
commission of a felony against him, inasmuch as he had reasonable cause to believe
that his wife and her companion were about to commit an act of adultery, which, under
the rule of State v. La Bounty, 64 Wash. 415, 116 Pac. 1073 (1911), is a crime against
the unoffending spouse. The court was not sufficiently impressed with the uniqueness
of the defense. The court, in rejecting the defendant's contention, stated that the felony
to be prevented must be one which threatens life or great bodily harm to the defendant's
3s Most states require a showing of something more than mere ordinary negligence
to convict the careless driver. 99 A. L. R. 756; 5 Am. JUR. 927, § 790; ILL. R!v. STAT.
1951, c 38, § 364 a.
39 In State v. Hedges, note 32 supra, the court suggested that if it be desirable to
require a finding of gross negligence to convict, a statutory change must be made since
the court could require no more than ordinary negligence under the existing man-
slaughter statute.
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person. Adultery is not a crime which imperils the life of the unoffending spouse or
threatens bodily harm to him. Although adultery is a crime against the unoffending
spouse, adultery is not a felony committed upon the innocent spouse within the
meaning of RCW 9.48.170, defining justifiable homicide.
DAMAGES
Punitive Damages-"Wilfulness" of Tort Feasor. In the recent
case of Grays Harbor County v. Bay City Lumber Co.' the Washington
Supreme Court construed the element of "wilfulness" in a conversion
action very narrowly, and has, by so doing, removed a source of pro-
tection for owners of private and public timber lands in this state. The
case involved an action by Grays Harbor County against an innocent
purchaser of timber cut by a prior converter on county lands.' The
value of the timber, as found by the trial court sitting without a jury,
was $8 per thousand board feet at the time of the first conversion and
$35 per thousand at the time of the purchase. The trial court expressly
found that the first converter acted "wilfully"' and, as a result,
assessed damages at the rate of $35 per thousand. In reversing the
trial court in a six to three decision, the supreme court determined that
since these greater damages would be punitive damages, which are not
generally favored in Washington,' this result should be avoided. This
result was achieved by strictly construing "wilfulness" as had been
done in decisions' under the Washington treble damage statute. The
1 147 Wash. Dec. 792, 289 P2d 975 (1955).
' The facts of the case are as follows: A small group of "gypo" loggers acquired
timber rights to a tract of land immediately adjacent to the plaintiff county land.
Although the vendor described the timber sold, the loggers realized that a survey was
necessary since the tract was unmarked. They were unable to secure the services of a
surveyor as soon as they would have liked and so proceeded to survey the area them-
selves "using a compass and a length of rope" and with occasional reference to Geodetic
Survey and Metzker maps. The loggers were unsuccessful in their efforts to determine
the true boundaries and in cutting the timber, trespassed onto the county land and
cut a substantial amount there. They then hauled the timber to defendant's sawmill and
sold it. Plaintiff elected to bring suit against the lumber company. It, in turn, inter-
pleaded the loggers as cross defendants.
3 The exact words of the trial court were that the taking of the timber by the loggers
was "heedless and wanton, not unintentional and inadvertent." 147 Wash. Dec. at 793,
289 P.2d at 977.
4 Spokane Truck and Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891) ; Ander-
son v. Dalton, 40 Wn.2d 894, 246 P.2d 853, 35 A.L.R.2d 302 (1952).
Bailey v. Hayden, 65 Wash. 57, 117 Pac. 720 (1911) ; Hirt v. Entus, 37 Wn.2d 418,
224 P.2d 620 (1950) ; Martinson v. Gregorsen, 129 Wash. 701, 225 Pac. 243 (1924).
"Not even where defendant knows his right is in question, are treble damages allowed."
Gibon v. Thisius, 16 Wn2d 693, 134 P2d 713 (1943); Chappell v. Puget Sound
Reduction Co., 27 Wash. 63, 67 Pac. 391 (1901) ; Tonsrud v. Puget Sound Traction
Light and Power Co., 91 Wash. 660, 158 Pac. 348 (1916) ; Gardner v. Lovegren, 27
Wash. 356, 67 Pac. 615 (1902). But see: Harold v. Toomey, 92 Wash. 297, 158 Pac.
986 (1916).
6 RCW 64.12.030. It would seem that RCW 79.40.030 would be applicable in cases
where county lands are involved, depending upon how the phrase "public lands of the
state" is construed. However, no cases seem to have done so.
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